Why do manufacturing firms produce services ?
Evidence for the servitization paradox in Belgium. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 330 by Blanchard, Pierre et al.
Working Paper Research
by Pierre Blanchard, Catherine Fuss and Claude Mathieu
November 2017 No 330
Why do manufacturing firms produce services ? 
Evidence for the servitization paradox in Belgium
  NBB WORKING PAPER No. 330 - NOVEMBER 2017 
 
Editor 
Jan Smets, Governor of the National Bank of Belgium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statement of purpose: 
The purpose of these working papers is to promote the circulation of research results (Research Series) and analytical 
studies (Documents Series) made within the National Bank of Belgium or presented by external economists in seminars, 
conferences and conventions organised by the Bank. The aim is therefore to provide a platform for discussion. The opinions 
expressed are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bank of Belgium. 
 
 
Orders 
For orders and information on subscriptions and reductions: National Bank of Belgium, 
Documentation - Publications service, boulevard de Berlaimont 14, 1000 Brussels 
 
Tel +32 2 221 20 33 - Fax +32 2 21 30 42 
 
The Working Papers are available on the website of the Bank: http://www.nbb.be 
 
 
© National Bank of Belgium, Brussels 
 
All rights reserved. 
Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged.  
 
ISSN: 1375-680X (print) 
ISSN: 1784-2476 (online) 
NBB WORKING PAPER No. 330 – NOVEMBER 2017  
 
Abstract 
 
The increasing role of services in GDP results from the growing share of service industries, but also 
from the fact that firms produce services along with goods. This paper investigates the determinants 
of service provision by manufacturing firms. First, it develops a model of differentiated products 
with, on the demand side, complementarities between the firm’s goods and services, and, on the 
supply side, rivalry in the allocation of expertise between the production of goods and the provision 
of services. Second, it provides an econometric assessment of the determinants of servitization for 
manufacturing firms, using a fractional Probit model with heterogeneity, controlling for endogeneity 
with respect to unobserved firm characteristics. Both the theoretical model and empirical estimates 
point to a non-linear relationship between servitization and firm productivity. The relationship is 
further shaped by the sector environment as well as intrinsic characteristics of the goods and 
services supplied. 
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1 
Introduction 
In recent decades, the provision of services has become increasingly important. In 
Belgium for example, the share of manufacturing industries in GDP declined from 0.21 in 
1995-1999 to 0.16 in the recent 2010-2014 period, while the share of services went up from 
0.63 to 0.68 over the same period. This is also apparent from the net job creation figures, with 
161.8 thousand job losses in the manufacturing sector between 1995 and 2014 (one job in 
four), and 849.1 thousand jobs created in the service sector, an increase of 30%. 
 In developed countries, the growing share of the service sectors in aggregate GDP and 
employment- deindustrialisation - is now accompanied by a process of servitization. 
Servitization refers to the provision of services by a company whose main or initial activity is 
to produce and sell goods. For example, Rolls-Royce offers “power by the hour” contracts: 
packages of support services for aircraft engines. IBM, initially a hardware manufacturer, has 
shifted to service activities such as consulting, financing, training and so on, to offer a bundle 
of goods and services.   
Servitization challenges the way we think about firms, production, consumption, and 
industry. For firms that engage in servitization, this represents a change in business, 
production and organisational models. It may affect the firm's performance in terms of profit, 
market power, survival, investment, employment, and so on. Engaging in servitization also 
represents a risky investment that does not always bring higher profits. Developing a new 
activity that differs from goods production involves costs, and organisational and managerial 
challenges. The risks of failure are significant, and profits associated with services may not 
compensate for those risks, or may be lower than the profits generated by producing goods 
alone. From the consumer’s point of view, when servitization amounts to providing packages 
of goods and services, it is also a way of increasing product differentiation. This broadens the 
range of product varieties and the value of the product for the consumer, who benefits from a 
goods-services package from a single supplier. Finally, servitization also modifies the extent 
and nature of competition both within the sector and between manufacturing and (some) 
service sectors. 
Why do firms engage in servitization? That question has elicited many comments and 
studies in the business literature (Gebauer et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2016, among others). There 
are multiple reasons for developing service activities. Producing services may be motivated 
by  diversification  of  activities  and  profit  risks.  Offering  services  along  with  goods  may  
improve the attractiveness of the product or the brand, strengthening customer relationships, 
differentiating the product from that of competitors, and thereby securing a competitive 
advantage  over  competitors  and  creating  barrier  to  entry.  As  such,  the  strategy  may  be  
adopted by large companies to protect or develop their market shares. But it may also be a 
way for small firms to penetrate a market with new and more tailored-made products. It may 
also be a necessary defensive strategy for firms faced with increasing competition from other 
firms that do provide the goods-services bundle. In sum, we face a servitization paradox 
where highly efficient manufacturing firms can afford the cost, financing and risks of 
developing a new service activity, but so can less efficient manufacturing firms that use a 
servitization strategy as a defensive strategy to remain active or grow. 
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The main objective of this paper is to provide some insights into this paradox. To do 
so, we propose a model of monopolistic competition with firm performance heterogeneity. 
This model allows us to conduct an econometric analysis of servitization from Belgian firm-
level panel data over the period 1997-2013.   
The issue of servitization has received substantial attention in the business literature, 
but theoretical and econometric evidence is scarce. Recent microeconomic papers that 
describe the servitization process are, for example, Bernard et al. (2016) and Crozet and Milet 
(2014). The former analyse the decline in manufacturing production in Denmark, focusing on 
firms  that  switch  from manufacturing  industries  to  service  sectors.    The  latter  describe  the  
servitization process in France at the firm level, using available firm-level data on sales of 
goods and services. Their figures reveal substantial heterogeneity in the degree of 
servitization, even within industry; most firms sell few if any services, but some are heavily 
servitized. Finally, estimations by Dachs et al., (2014) for a set of firms across 10 European 
countries point to a non-linear relationship between firm size and servitization. 
On the question of the relevant determinants of servitization, the theoretical literature 
is also limited. Lee et al. (2016) develop a duopoly model where the probability of 
manufacturers producing services depends, among other things, on the size of the market for 
the combined goods-services package, the complementarity between the use of goods and the 
consumption of services, and the firm's efficiency. Breinlich et al. (2014) analyse how 
changes in competition affect the relative production of goods as opposed to services. They 
develop a model where firms produce both goods and services and decide on the allocation of 
expertise to the production of goods and services. Following a decrease in the goods import 
tariff, the model predicts that firms reallocate expertise towards or away from the production 
of goods, depending on the elasticity of demand for goods relative to the elasticity of demand 
for services and the degree of expertise rivalry. Their empirical evaluation shows that reduced 
import tariffs on manufactured goods induced British firms to increase their provision of 
services.   
Another strand of the literature on servitization has considered the effect of 
servitization on firms' performance. Crozet and Milet (2015) analyse the relationship between 
servitization and firms' characteristics such as size, employment or profitability. Ariu et al., 
(2016) investigate how exports of services affect exports of goods. In their model there is 
demand complementarity between services and goods. They show that the increase in goods 
exports that follows from the provision of services operates through a rise in quantities under 
monopolistic competition and through charging higher prices under oligopolistic competition. 
Applying their model to Belgian export data, they confirm that export sales increase when 
services are exported to the same destination as the goods, and that this result is driven by an 
increase in export prices and in the perceived quality of exported goods. Finally, a couple of 
papers examine whether the availability of services, for example through trade or FDI, helps 
(other) manufacturing firms to improve their performance (see, for example, Arnold et al., 
2011; Fernandes and Paunov, 2012; Hijzen et al., 2011), their internationalisation through 
FDI (Gorg and Jabbour, 2016), or offshoring of intermediate inputs (Debaere et al., 2013).  
This paper focus on the determinants of firm servitization. We first develop a 
theoretical model where there is complementarity in the demand for goods and services, and 
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firms decide on the allocation of rivalrous expertise between the production of goods and the 
provision of services. As in the above-mentioned models, firms produce differentiated goods 
and services. On the demand side, as in Ariu et al. (2016), there is complementarity between 
goods and services. On the supply side, following Breinlich et al. (2014), when there is 
imperfect rivalry in expertise, firms may produce services along with goods without a major 
cost in terms of expertise resources. Our theoretical model suggests that the extent of 
servitization varies with firm characteristics, product characteristics and market conditions. 
First, servitization varies with firms' efficiency, but the relationship is likely to be non-linear. 
For different motives, both high-performance firms and low-performance firms may find it 
optimal to develop services provision. Second, the relationship between servitization and 
firms' efficiency depends on the degree of complementarity between goods and services, the 
degree of goods and services differentiation, and the degree of non rivalry in technology. 
Third, market conditions, in particular demand elasticities and the extent of competition, may 
shape this relationship. These factors imply that the relationship between servitization and 
firms' characteristics is likely to be nonlinear and may well differ from one sector to another. 
We evaluate empirically the determinants of firm servitization. We rely on three firm-
level datasets for Belgium over the period 1997-2013. Total firm sales are reported in VAT 
declarations. We match this information with firms' total sales of industrial goods from the 
Survey of Industrial Production. We then compute the servitization rate as the ratio of service 
sales, measured as the differences between total sales and goods sales, over total sales. We 
estimate a fractional Probit model controlling for endogeneity with respect to unobserved firm 
characteristics. Our specification allows for nonlinear effects of firm-level variables, e.g. TFP, 
age, size and average wage. We also include sector-level controls, i.e. the degree of 
competition, the mean and standard deviation of the servitization rate, as well as time and 
sector effects. For robustness we also consider a Tobit model.  Consistent with our model and 
previous discussion, our results point to a non-linear relation between servitization and firm 
characteristics. This suggests that it is not only the most efficient firms that provide services, 
but that less efficient firms may also engage in servitization. Furthermore, estimation by broad 
sector of economic activity confirms that, as well as the intrinsic characteristics of the goods 
and  services  supplied  by  the  sector,  such  as  differentiation  and  complementarity,  the  sector  
environment may also shape the relationship between servitization and firms' performance. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section I provides a survey of the 
relevant  literature.  Section  II  develops  our  theoretical  model.  Section  III  describes  the  data  
used in the empirical analysis in section IV. Section V concludes. 
I – Survey of the literature 
In this section, we first review relevant theoretical models before examining 
econometric analyses of servitization. 
Breinlich et al. (2014) investigate how an increase in competition affects services 
provision using a model with monopolistic competition and differentiated products. Firms 
produce both goods and services and decide on the allocation of their exogenously given 
expertise to the production of goods and services according to relative market conditions, the 
firm's total expertise level, the demand elasticity for goods and for services and, importantly, 
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the degree of rivalry in the use of expertise.  At one extreme of full  rivalry,  any extra use of 
expertise in the production of goods implies a reduction of the same amount of expertise in 
the production of services; at the other extreme of non rivalry the full amount of expertise can 
be used for both the production of goods and the production of services. Their setup differs 
from our model in that demand for goods is completely separable from demand for services; 
in other words there is no complementarity between the use of goods and the use of services. 
They  focus  on  how  trade  liberalisation  affects  the  relative  provision  of  services  and  
production of goods. They show that a decrease in goods import tariffs affects market 
conditions leading to reallocation of expertise between services and goods production. 
Intuitively, firms reallocate expertise towards goods production the greater the demand 
elasticity for goods compared to the demand elasticity for services and when there is more 
rivalry in technology. Conversely, they reinforce services production the greater the demand 
elasticity for services relative to that for goods, and the less rivalry there is in expertise. These 
effects are greater the larger the firm's stock of expertise. 
Ariu et al. (2016) develop a model with one-way complementarity of services to goods 
i.e. use of the goods is a prerequisite for use of the service. Complementarity is defined at the 
firm-product-market level. Exporting entails fixed costs, and exporting services implies an 
additional fixed cost. Providing services together with goods is a function of the extent of 
complementarity  between  goods  and  services,  as  well  as  market  conditions.  In  addition,  
exporting services also depends on the firm's ability to pay the extra fixed cost entailed. The 
model predicts that offering services along with goods allows firms to increase their export 
performance. The authors show that the channel through which export performance increases 
depends on the type of competition. Under monopolistic competition, bi-exporters sell a 
larger volume of goods than standard exporters, while under oligopolistic competition, 
services provision allows bi-exporters to increase their market power and consequently to 
charge higher prices for their goods sold abroad. 
Lee et al. (2016) consider two alternative market outcomes when there is 
complementarity between goods consumption and services consumption. They compare firms' 
profits where goods and services are produced by two different types of firms - manufacturers 
produce goods and service firms produce services – or by a single firm - a servitized 
manufacturer that sells both services and goods. Demand for the goods depends on the price 
and quality of the goods as well as on the price and quality of services (provided by the same 
firm or another firm). In this model, manufacturers have an incentive to provide services as 
well (i) when the market for the combined goods-services package increases, (ii) the greater 
the complementarity between the use of goods and the consumption of services, (iii) the more 
the two options (goods and services separately versus goods-services package) are 
substitutable, (iv) the higher the cost efficiency and improved quality of the servitized 
manufacturer. 
Econometric evidence on the determinants of servitization is scarce. Dachs et al., 
(2014) investigate the determinants of servitization for a set of firms in 10 European 
countries. Their results highlight a U-shaped relationship between firm size and servitization. 
Servitization is also positively related to product complexity and firms' product innovation, 
and is more present in intensive innovation sectors.  
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Crozet and Millet (2014) use a large firm-level dataset that reports information on 
goods  sales  and  service  sales.  From this,  they  measure  the  servitization  rate  as  the  share  of  
service revenues in firms' total sales, excluding retail services. They highlight two types of 
firms: most firms sell few if any services, while some specialise in services provision. For 
example, one third of the firms obtain at least 80% of their sales from services. The authors 
also draw attention to a negative relationship between servitization and firm size, labour 
productivity, capital intensity and average firm wage. Finally, estimating the number of 
workers employed by manufacturing (services) firms involved in the production of services 
(goods) reveals that the servitization phenomenon is 8% larger than suggested by traditional 
measures based on sector classification alone. 
Crozet and Millet (2015) analyse the relationship between servitization and firms' 
characteristics. More precisely, they investigate the impact of starting to provide services on 
firms’ outcomes. Restricting their attention to firms that obtain less than half of their turnover 
from  the  provision  of  services,  they  find  that  servitized  firms  are  larger  (in  terms  of  
employment and turnover) and more profitable than non-servitized firms. Furthermore, firms 
that start selling services experience an increase in their profitability of between 3.7% and 
5.3%, they increase their total sales by 3.7%, and increase their sales of goods by 3.6%. Their 
results also highlight that the benefits of starting to sell services are greater for micro and 
small firms than for larger ones, and vary across sectors. In particular, providing services 
boosts sales of goods in some sectors, but becomes a substitute for them in others. 
Breinlich et al. (2014) consider firms' service revenues relative to goods revenues. 
They rely on a Poisson model to explain why most firms do not produce services and to 
account for the skewed distribution of revenues. The specification relates the goods/services 
revenue ratio to export and import trade tariffs for goods and services, controlling for firms' 
productivity and labour input prices as well as year effects, sector-level time trends, and firm 
effects. Estimating the model on firm-level data for the United Kingdom over 1997-2007, 
their results suggest that a reduction in goods import tariffs leads to an increase in service   
revenues, and that the effect is more pronounced for firms with a higher R&D stock, and 
smaller for capital-intensive firms. 
Ariu et al. (2016) evaluate how exporting both goods and services (being bi-exporters) 
to a given destination impacts on goods export sales to that destination, using transaction 
export data by firm, destination and product for Belgium over 1997-2005. To control for the 
endogeneity of being a bi-exporter, they rely on a two-step IV estimation strategy. Their 
results show that export sales increase when services are exported to the same destination, 
controlling for the number of products exported to that destination, firms' export experience 
on that product market, and apparent labour productivity, multinational status and belonging 
to the service sector. Furthermore, this effect is mainly attributable to an increase in export 
prices, and shows up in an increase in the perceived quality of the goods exported, as 
measured by the Khandelwal et al. (2013) index.  
II – An illustrative Model 
To examine the servitization paradox, we assume an economy with two monopolistic 
competition sectors. In these manufacturing and service sectors there is a continuum of firms. 
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Each firm is multiproduct in the sense that it produces a differentiated good and a 
differentiated service simultaneously. There is a continuum of consumers of the same type 
with a utility function separable and linear in the numeraire good. Therefore, there are no 
income effects on the monopolistic competition sectors and we can perform a partial 
equilibrium  analysis.  Our  model  is  similar  to  that  of  Breinlich  et  al.  (2014).  Firms  are  
multiproduct and heterogeneous in their level of productivity. Furthermore, they can allocate 
some specific knowledge across goods and services production processes according to the 
degree of non- rivalry in respect of the specific knowledge. However, to deal explicitly with 
goods and services that are complementary for consumers, for example when we consider that 
services may adapt the goods' functionality (Cusumano et al., 2015), we use a different 
demand system based on a quadratic utility function as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). 
Demand 
Preferences are defined over a continuum of differentiated varieties of goods and 
services indexed by i. The utility of a representative consumer c of L consumers  in  the  
economy is given by 
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where N is the mass of consumed varieties1, , , andg sD J J T  are positive parameters, ciq  and 
c
iy  represent for c his individual consumption levels of good variety i and of service variety i 
(produced by the same firm i), respectively. The parameters gJ  and sJ  express the specific 
consumer's preferences for goods and services. They also index the degree of product 
differentiation between the varieties. When 0gJ   ( 0sJ  ), the varieties are perfect 
substitutes and both markets are homogeneous. Consequently, consumers only care about 
their consumption level over all varieties 
0
N
c c
iQ q di ³   
0
N
c c
iY y di
§ · ¨ ¸
© ¹³
 . The degree of product 
differentiation increases with gJ  (or sJ )  as  consumers  give  increasing  weight  to  the  
distribution levels of consumption across varieties. In the same vein, the parameter T  
expresses the degree of complementarity between variety i of good and variety i of service. 
This degree ranges from zero when the varieties of goods and services are independent for 
consumers to  gJ  ( sJ ) when the varieties are perfect complements for them (Vives, 1984).  
The inverse demand by the representative consumer c for the variety of good and for 
the variety of service produced by firm i can be written as follows: 
                                                             
1  To simplify the model, we assume an identical mass for good varieties and service varieties. We 
assume also that all varieties are consumed. 
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By assuming that consumers are uniformly distributed across the range of varieties, 
equation (2) and equation (3) can be inverted to yield the linear market demand for good and 
service varieties i, 
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L represents a continuum of consumers, 
0
(1 )
N
g g
iP N p di ³  and 
0
(1 )
N
s s
iP N p di ³  are the 
average prices of goods and services, respectively that are taken as exogenous by firm i.  The 
parameters a and a’ are both positive if the mass of the consumed variety is sufficiently large 
( 1N t  ) and if the degree of differentiation exceeds the degree of complementarity (
min( , )g sJ J T! ) or in other word if goods and services cannot be perfect complements. Note 
that when these two conditions are fulfilled, the other parameters of the demand functions are 
positive. 
Production 
As in Breinlich et al. (2014), firm i’s production functions for goods and services are 
assumed to take the following form: 
 i ig igq T L    (6) 
i is isy T L    (7) 
8 
where igT  and isT  are firm-specific productivity terms and the firm’s labour inputs used to 
produce goods and services are igL  and isL .  The  labour  cost  w is given and is the same 
across sectors. 
The production processes of firms are increasingly based on assets such as the 
invention of new processes and/or products, and improvements in employee skills and brand 
image. These factors labelled as “intangible capital,” represent a key component of firms' 
knowledge which is crucial to their productive performance (Marrocu et al., 2012; Bontempi 
and Mairesse, 2015). When firms produce goods and services simultaneously, it may not be 
possible to separate the knowledge embodied in the service from that embodied in the good, 
especially in the case of "adapting" services (Cusumano et al., 2015). This non-separability 
may  result  from  the  fact  that  knowledge  has  the  characteristics  of  a  public  good.  More  
precisely, knowledge can be considered as non-rivalrous in its use in the production of goods 
and services. Hence, increased use of knowledge to produce a good may not reduce the 
knowledge available to produce a service. Following Breinlich et al. (2014), the stock of 
knowledge is assumed fixed within the firm and a CES function is used to model the degree 
of non-rivalry in knowledge across the production of goods and services, 
 1t t ti ig isT T T     (8) 
where (0, )t f . For high values of t, knowledge can be considered as non-rivalrous. In other 
words, when t o f  ,  the  firm  can  use  the  full  amount  of   iT  simultaneously in both 
production processes. 
Firm i maximises its profit by choosing the optimal prices ( ,g si ip p ), and the optimal 
amounts of knowledge to allocate to the production of goods and services ( ,ig isT T ). The 
objective function can be expressed as follows: 
     
 
, , ,
1
' ' 'max
. .
g s
i i ig is
g g s g
i ig ig
s s g s g s
i i i i i i ig is
p p T T
i i
t t t
i ig is s is
p L a bp cp dP eP p L a b p cp eP d P w
q T L y T L
L L
s t T T T   
          
 
    (9) 
From  the  first  order  conditions,  we  can  get  the  optimal  selling  prices  of  goods  and  
services given by, 
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It is easy to check that the “composite” parameters obtained in both expressions are all 
positive. Consequently, higher average selling prices on markets for the good and the service 
allow the firm to charge a higher optimal own-price. As the good and the service are 
complementary, each own price of the firm depends on both average prices even though the 
effect of sP  on  igp  is lower than the effect of 
gP  on igp   ' ' 'b d ce b e cd !   since it is 
assumed that the good and the service are not perfect complements. The same reasoning is 
applied in the case of the service price. However, the effect of sP  on isp is now greater than 
the effect of gP   'bd ce be cd !  . Both optimal prices of firm i also depend negatively on 
igT  and isT . A larger amount of knowledge allocated to the production of one type of product 
improves the productivity of the more competitive firm, which can therefore reduce its 
optimal  price.  However,  as  the  global  amount  of  knowledge  is  given  ( iT  is fixed) and 
knowledge is partially a non-rival product  1( )t t tis i igT T T  , the firm cannot improve its 
competitiveness simultaneously on both markets. From the first order conditions on igT  and 
isT , the rule for the optimal allocation of knowledge between goods production and services 
production is given by, 
1
1 t
is i
ig i
T y
T q
§ · ¨ ¸
© ¹
   (12) 
where 
2
g s
i
ig is
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T T
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  that 
represent the optimal quantities of goods and services sold by the firm. Note that the amount 
of knowledge in goods and the amount of knowledge in services both have a positive effect 
on the quantities of goods and services sold. But as the goods and services are not perfect 
complements ( gJ T!   and sJ T! ), the impact of  igT  on iq  is greater than the effect of isT
.The same result holds for iy  with isT  now having a larger impact. Expression (12) highlights 
that  the  optimal  ratio  between  services  and  goods  sold  depends  on  the  distribution  of  
knowledge for the production of goods and the production of services. The larger the amount 
of knowledge allocated to the service sector, the higher the output ratio. However, the 
relationship in (12) is nonlinear and the knowledge ratio is exactly equal to the output ratio 
only if t=0 .  This  corresponds  to  the  case  where  knowledge  is  perfectly  rivalrous  in  its  use  
across output types: increased use of knowledge in producing one output type results in a 
corresponding reduction in the amount of knowledge available for producing the other output 
type. When t increases, the rivalry in use of knowledge decreases and the knowledge ratio 
increases by less than a proportional change in the output ratio. This first analysis is partial as 
it does not capture the fact that optimal quantities of goods and services also depend on the 
amount of knowledge isT  and isT . Next, a comparative statics analysis must be carried out. 
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Comparative statics 
Our analysis diverges from Breinlich et al. (2014) in two ways. First, we do not 
analyse the effects of fiercer (international) competition on servitization. Rather, we focus on 
how the firm allocates its knowledge to the production of services according to its total 
amount of knowledge, or similarly according to its global productive performance. The 
objective  is  to  provide  some  insights  into  the  “service  paradox”  in  the  sense  that  the  most  
productive firms are not the only ones to engage in servitization; less productive firms may 
also do that (Gebauer et al., 2005; Crozet and Milet, 2015). Second, following Ariu et al. 
(2016), we consider that goods and services may be viewed by consumers as complements. 
As T  is defined over 0,min( , )g sJ Jº ª¼ ¬ , the model can take into account various degrees of 
complementarity.  Using  the  typology  proposed  by  Cusumano  et  al.  (2015),  we  assume  the  
degree of complementarity is lower for “smoothing” services - that just facilitate the 
purchases of goods by customers - than for “adapting” services that are able to expand the 
goods' functionality or help the customers to develop new uses for the goods. 
The total differential of expression (12) with respect to isT  and iT  allows us to 
determine what happens to servitization at the equilibrium when the exogenous amount of 
knowledge in the firm changes. Hence, we have, 
1
d
d
t
igis is
i i is ig
T AT T
T T T B T A
 § ·§ · ¨ ¸¨ ¸ ¨ ¸© ¹ © ¹
    (13) 
where  
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. 
When 
d 0,
d
is
i
T
T
!  an increase in the productive performance of the firm raises its servitization. 
However as indicated in Table 1, the effect of knowledge/performance on servitization is not 
so clear-cut and depends in the first instance on the signs of A and B.  In  most  cases,  an  
increase in service provision follows a positive productivity shock, but in two cases (Cases 3-
a, 4-a), an increase in servitization follows a negative productivity shock. 
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Table 1: relationship between the total amount of knowledge and servitization 
Case n°1     A>0 and B>0  
d 0
d
is
i
T
T
!  
Case n°2     A<0 and B<0 
d 0
d
is
i
T
T
!  
Case n°3-a    A<0 and B>0 
d 0
d
is
i
T
T
  if 0is igT B T A !  
Case n°3-b    A<0 and B>0 
d 0
d
is
i
T
T
!   if 0is igT B T A   
Case n°4-a     A>0 and B<0 
d 0
d
is
i
T
T
  if 0is igT B T A   
Case n°4-b    A>0 and B<0 
d 0
d
is
i
T
T
!   if   0is igT B T A !  
 
Expression A corresponds to the total differential of igT on both sides of (12). 
Rewriting A as 
 1 11
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, the left term in A is the difference between, 
first the direct effect of igT  on the quantity of goods sold weighted by  1 tisT  , and,  second, 
the indirect effect of igT on the quantity of services supplied weighted by  1 tigT  . Note that 
the indirect effect exists because the goods and services are complementary, and that the 
indirect effect is lower than the direct effect. Therefore, one can have 0A ! so long as igT is 
not too large compared to isT . By contrast, when igT is much larger than isT , the weighted 
indirect effect can exceed the weighted direct effect and one can have 0A  .  The same 
reasoning applies for B that corresponds to the total differential of expression (12) with 
respect to isT . B is the difference between the direct effect of isT on the quantity of service 
supplied multiplied by  1 tigT   and the indirect effect of isT  on the quantity of goods sold 
multiplied by  1 tisT  . However expressions A and B also depend on the quantities of goods 
and services sold and on the degree of non-rivalry (t), which renders the analysis technically 
challenging. Fortunately, it is easy to establish the forms of the implicit functions A=0 and 
B=0  with  respect  to  isT  and igT .  Furthermore,  we  have  to  consider  the  constraints  that  the  
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quantities of goods and services must both be positive, or equivalently that gigT bw dP!  and 
' ' sisT b w d P! . 
Figure 1 allows us to present more comprehensive findings drawn from our model. 
The lines gigT bw dP!  and ' ' sisT b w d P! delimit the area of values of isT and igT such that 
both goods and services are produced. The curves A=0 and B=0 delimit the areas where both 
A and B are positive (green area, corresponding to Case 1), and A<0 and B>0 (Case 3-a and 
3-b), A>0 and B<0 (Cases 4-a and 4-b), and both A and B are negative (corresponding to Case 
2). Finally,, the condition TisB+TigA=0 defines the limit between Case 3-a (yellow area) 
andCase 3-b (blue), and between Case 4-a (red area) and Case 4-b (blue). We distinguish 
between highly efficient firms - those with a high Ti - and less efficient firms. The former are 
in  the  North-East  area  of  Figure  1,  where  both  isT  and isT  are themselves high. The less 
efficient firms are represented in the coloured areas. 
Proposition 1: A negative productivity shock (a decrease in iT ) leads the less 
efficient firms to increase their servitization (an increase in isT ) in two mutually 
exclusive situations:   
1) Knowledge is allocated more to goods provision ( ig isT T! ) and 
knowledge is not too rivalrous (t>1); 
2) Knowledge  is  allocated  more  to  service  provision  ( is igT T! ) even if 
knowledge is rivalrous. 
 
The first case of Proposition 1 corresponds to case 3-a. In this case, less efficient firms 
find it optimal to reinforce their presence in the service sector (yellow area) because a large 
part of their knowledge ( iT ) is allocated more to goods provision than to service provision. 
Firstly, in B, the direct positive effect of isT on iy   is amplified by  1 tigT   while the indirect 
effect of isT on iq is limited by  1 tisT   because of the relatively small value of Tis. The 
difference between these two effects is positive and that favours the realisation of 0B ! . For 
B>0 when  1 ' 1tig isT T b c !  or equivalently  1 1tig is gT T J T !   , it should also be verified 
that the right-hand term of B ((1+t)qi) is small. That is very likely in this case since the firm's 
performance is weak, so iq  is low.2 Secondly, A must be negative. This arises when the 
indirect effect of isT on iq is amplified by 
1( ) tigT
 .  The left-hand term of A is negative when 
 1 1tis igT T b c !  or equivalently  1 1tis ig sT T J T ! . Since firms produce a limited quantity 
of services, the right-hand term of A ( (1 ) )it y   is more negative when there is less rivalry in 
technology (t is large). Thirdly, to verify d d 0is iT T  , the additional condition that 
0is igT B T A ! must also hold. Taken together, these conditions indicate that allocating a large 
                                                             
2  Here we do not have to discuss the degree of non-rivalry since t is introduced as factor of iq in the right-hand 
term of B while it appears as exponent in the left-hand term. 
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part of knowledge to goods provision is not enough to allow the firm to intensify its 
servitization. It is also necessary that knowledge is non-rivalrous or equivalently that t is large 
enough so that the firm is not discouraged from intensifying its servitization.  
The  second  case  of  proposition  1  corresponds  to  case  4-a  in  Table  1,  where  
d d 0is iT T  , and to the red area in Figure 1. Here, isT  is sufficiently large compared to igT  to 
amplify  the  direct  effect  of  igT  on iq  (A>0)  and  the  indirect  effect  of  igT on iy (B<0). The 
additional condition that 0is igT B T A   is likely to be verified, since the firm has already 
allocated a large part of its knowledge to service provision and B<0, even for some weak 
degrees of non-rivalry in knowledge. In this case, where the allocation of knowledge to 
service provision exceeds the allocation of knowledge to goods provision, it is optimal for the 
firm to increase its servitization, as knowledge becomes scarcer. As A and B correspond to the 
total  differential  of  both  sides  of  (12)  with  respect  to  igT and isT , respectively, we have 
ig isdT dT B A . In case 3-a and case 4-a, we can then conclude that a decrease in knowledge 
leads to a decline in goods provision.  
Having examined the cases where d d 0is iT T  ,  we  now turn  to  the  cases  where  it  is  
not systematically verified for less efficient firms. A positive productivity shock may increase 
the servitization of this type of firms even if the allocation of knowledge is unbalanced 
between service provision and goods provision. This corresponds to case 3-b and 4-b, the blue 
area in Figure 1. As previously mentioned, case 3-b arises because there is too much rivalry in 
knowledge allocation. When t is  low,  it  is  more  likely  that  we  have  0is igT B T A  , leading 
the firm to intensify its presence in the production of goods. Furthermore, case 4-b may 
challenge case 4-a only when knowledge is not sufficiently unbalanced in favour of service 
provision. Then we can have 0is igT B T A !  and consequently d d 0is iT T ! .  Note  that  from  
ig isdT dT B A  in case 3-b and case 4-a, we can conclude that a decrease in knowledge now 
implies an increase in goods provision.  
If the allocation of knowledge is more balanced between both production activities, a positive 
(negative) productivity shock  induces an increase (decrease) in the amount of knowledge 
transferred to the production of services (green area, case 1, A>0 and B>0). This condition is 
fulfilled if (i) the first terms of A and B are both positive. This happens if the weighted direct 
effect of igT  on iq  exceeds the weighted indirect effect of igT  on iy in A and the weighted 
direct effect of isT  on iy  exceeds the weighted indirect effect of isT  on iq in B. This is 
immediate in the case of a perfectly balanced allocation of knowledge (Tis=Tig), because by 
assumption, the complementarity between goods and services (T ) is relatively low compared 
to the degree of product differentiation on both markets ( gJ  and sJ ). In the more general 
case, the condition is verified if we have simultaneously   1 ' 1tig isT T b c !  (or equivalently 
 1 1tig is gT T J T ! ) and  1 1tis igT T b c !  (or equivalently  1 1tis ig sT T J T ! ) ; (ii) the last 
terms of A and B are  not  too  negative.  This  is  the  case  the  greater  the  rivalry  concerning  
knowledge, or equivalently the lower the value of t, and when the firm's performance is weak, 
i.e. when ,iq iy  are small. 
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Proposition 2: A positive productivity shock always leads more efficient firms 
to intensify their servitization. 
The more efficient firms are in the North-East area of Figure 1. In this area, iT  is high, 
then isT  and igT  are themselves high. As expected, the more efficient firms react to a 
productivity shock in allocating more knowledge to both service provision and goods 
provision, as A and B have the same sign. Note that in this area, A and B are simultaneously 
negative. This means that the right-hand terms of both expressions, i.e. the quantities of goods 
and services sold, are dominant over the left-hand terms, i.e. whatever the sign of the 
difference between direct effect and indirect effect in A and B.  
Proposition 3: when competition  is  weak  and  the  degree  of  complementarity  
between goods and services is high, the less efficient firms are present on the 
markets and are engaged in servitization like the efficient firms. 
From conditions gigT bw dP!  and ' ' sisT b w d P! , it appears immediately that for 
low market prices, gP  and sP ,  the less efficient firms are on the fringe, outside both 
markets. In that case, on very competitive markets, servitization is not a strategy that these 
firms can use to stay in the market. More interestingly, a high degree of complementarity 
allows the less productive firms to be present in both markets and to benefit from servitization 
( 0gbw dP Tw w  ). In fact, through T , there is a “bonus” for consumers if they buy goods 
and services from the same firm, and the higher T  , the larger this bonus.  
To sum up, our model indicates that the inverted U-shaped relationship between 
servitization and firms' performance may exist but is not systematic. Less efficient firms can 
increase their service provision when hit by a negative productivity shock in some cases. But 
in other cases, firms may find it optimal to decrease their service provision, especially when 
knowledge is rivalrous. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 1, the more efficient firms may find  
it optimal to use a servitization strategy. In this case, the relationship between servitization 
and performance is always positive. Note that when goods and services cannot be easily 
bundled or when competition on the service market is fierce, the efficient firms (like the less 
efficient firms) prefer not to engage in service provision. Ultimately, empirical analysis must 
be used to determine whether the U-shaped relationship between servitization and firms' 
performance is verified.  
15 
Figure 1: Degree of servitization and firms' performance 
 
III – Data description 
The analysis relies on firm-level data for Belgium over 1997-2013. It combines three 
data sources: the Survey of Industrial Production, VAT returns, and the Central Balance Sheet 
Register. This section describes the construction of our variables. 
To construct a measure of servitization we use data from the Survey of Industrial 
Production and VAT returns. The first reports the amount of industrial goods sold by 8-digit 
product for each firm in the survey. It covers just over 4000 firms per year, mostly in the 
manufacturing sector. We aggregate data at the firm level to obtain firms' sales of goods. We 
complement this information with data on total sales as reported by firms in VAT returns. 
These report firms' turnover and consumption of intermediate inputs on a monthly or 
quarterly basis, depending on the firm's size, and the information is aggregated at the firm-
year level. We control for the amount due to “processing on commission”, also available in 
the  Survey  of  Industrial  Production  dataset.  We measure  services  as  the  difference  between 
total sales and goods sales including processing on commission. To adjust for reporting errors, 
we exclude servitization rates below -0.05 or above 1.05; and winsorize the remaining 
observations at the [0, 1] range. Contrary to Crozet and Millet (2014, 2015) we do not exclude 
retail activities from the firms' services.  
Additional firm-level variables are based on VAT declarations and balance sheet data. 
Firms' sales and intermediate input consumption are taken from the former. Balance sheet 
data are used for the remaining variables: value added, employment, average wage and labour 
cost,  investment  and  capital.  For  balance  sheet  data,  we  perform  a  small  set  of  corrections  
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concerning dates and years or an apparently erroneous number of months in the annual 
accounts.3 After that, the annual account information was annualised4 and extrapolated. The 
sector of activity is determined according to the most commonly reported NACE codes 
available for each firm over the period, converted to the NACE-Rev2 classification where 
necessary. We use the 2-digit NACE-Rev2 deflators published in the National Accounts to 
obtain the real values of the nominal variables. We rely on value added, investment and 
intermediate consumption deflators. 
We construct a set of firm-level characteristics. Employment is defined as the average 
number of employees in Full-Time Equivalents over the year. Size is the log of employment. 
The firm's average wage is given by the firm's wage bill over the average number of 
employees in Full-Time Equivalents over the year. The firm's age is based on the official 
starting date of the company.  
To construct a measure of Total Factor Productivity, production function coefficients 
are estimated according to the methodology of Ackerberg et al., (2015). We rely on data on 
firms' value added, capital stock at the beginning of the year, average number of employees in 
Full-Time Equivalents over the year, and intermediate inputs consumption. Investment in 
physical capital is used as the proxy variable. Production function coefficients are estimated at 
the level of broad macroeconomic sectors, to ensure a sufficiently large sample size for each 
sector. Table A1 in Appendix A reports the estimated production function together with t-stat 
and number of observations by broad economic sector. Table A.2 in the Appendix reports 
descriptive statistics of the firm-level variables used to explain servitization, namely TFP, age, 
employment, and wage. Table A.3 reports moments of the distribution of TFP across sectors. 
We also construct a set of sector-level variables at the 2-digit NACE Rev2 level. The 
yearly Herfindahl index is constructed on the basis of firms' sales as reported in the 
exhaustive  sample  of  VAT  returns.  We  also  consider  two  measures  of  the  extent  of  
servitization within the sector. We compute the mean and standard deviation of the 
servitization rate at the sector and year level. The mean servitization rate aims to capture 
imitation effects, whereby firms may follow their competitors' strategy in terms of 
servitization. Furthermore, a low dispersion across servitization rates may, for instance, reflect 
the fact that goods and services in the sector can be readily bundled, so that all firms have to 
provide goods along with services. 
In the analysis below, we focus on firms with at least 20 employees, active in the 
manufacturing sector over the period 1997-2013. More precisely, we consider firms classified 
as belonging to NACE Rev2 classification between 10 and 33. A firm is considered as active 
if it reports positive employment, total assets and nominal fixed tangible assets above 100 
euro. We exclude coke and refined petroleum products sector because the number of 
                                                             
3  For example, when the year-end date was 2 January 2005, we changed the date to 31 December 2004. By 
doing this we attributed the values reported in the annual accounts to the year 2004 instead of 2005. 
4  Flows are adjusted by taking a weighted average of t and t+1 flows. Stocks are adjusted by adding to the 
current year stock the weighted change in stocks between the current and next year. The procedure attributes 
a missing value when there is not enough information to reconstruct the entire year, for example when 
information about the first months or the last months of a given year is missing. This does not apply to the 
last year in which the firm is observed, or to flows in the first year that the firm is covered. 
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observations in the sector is far too small. Our final sample includes 37,228 observations, 
covering 3,538 firms over the period 1997-2013.  
Servitization of the manufacturing sector is not a minor phenomenon. In our sample, 
one quarter of aggregate sales of manufacturing firms are related to services, on average, over 
1997-2013. As shown in Figure 2, the distribution of servitization is very unequal with most 
firms selling few services,  or none at  all.  In this sample,  servitization reaches at  least  5% in 
56% percent of the cases. Consistent with Crozet and Millet (2014), we find that 87% of firms 
sell some services.5 However, the number of firms providing services decreases rapidly with 
the degree of servitization. The degree of servitization is close to zero in a very large fraction 
of the cases; in the first quartile, the figure is around 0.25, and the in last decile it is around 
0.50, i.e. servitization is above 50% in only 10% of the cases.  
Figure 2 – Histogram of the servitization ratio for Belgian manufacturing firms, 1997-
2013 
 
Sources: Survey on Industrial Production and VAT declarations, and Central Balance Sheet Office 
Sample of firms with 20 employees or more 
 
We then examine differences across broad sectors of economic activity, defined as 
groups of NACE-Rev2.0 sectors. As shown in Table 2, the servitization rate varies across 
sectors. Chemical and pharmaceutical industries have median servitization rates around 20%. 
At the other extreme, wood and metal have median servitization rates at around 3 percent. 
Furthermore, there is substantial heterogeneity within sectors as evidenced by the interquartile 
range, or the gap between the 5th and the 95th percentiles.   
                                                             
5  They find that, in 2007, 83% of French manufacturing firms sold services. 
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Table 2 – Servitization rate by broad sector of economic activity 
 # obs mean sd p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 
Food, beverages and tobacco 5803 0.17 0.22 0.000 0.013 0.077 0.246 0.657 
Textiles, wearing apparel and 
leather  3304 0.18 0.26 0.000 0.008 0.063 0.244 0.839 
Wood, paper and printing  4044 0.11 0.18 0.000 0.002 0.030 0.117 0.540 
Chemicals 2800 0.28 0.26 0.000 0.068 0.204 0.418 0.815 
Pharmaceutical products 584 0.25 0.22 0.006 0.075 0.193 0.374 0.685 
Rubber and plastics, and other  
non-metallic mineral products 5199 0.17 0.20 
0.000 
0.020 0.104 0.262 0.587 
Metal 6466 0.14 0.23 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.151 0.701 
Computer, electronic and 
optical products, electrical 
equipment  2285 0.21 0.26 0 0.007 0.091 0.323 0.814 
Machinery and equipment 3258 0.19 0.25 0.000 0.008 0.091 0.287 0.794 
Transport equipment  1348 0.17 0.21 0.000 0.022 0.101 0.244 0.652 
Furniture; other manufacturing  1974 0.14 0.20 0 0.002 0.045 0.216 0.565 
Repair and installation of 
machinery and equipment  163 0.21 0.28 0 0.000 0.084 0.295 0.794 
Total 37228 0.17 0.23 0.000 0.008 0.071 0.247 0.707 
 
To illustrate whether servitization is associated with higher output sales or is a 
substitute for the firm's production of goods, we run two types of analysis. The first relates the 
log of goods sales on an indicator dummy for services provision, sector and year effects. The 
second focuses on firms that do provide services and regresses the log of goods sales on the 
log of service sales, year and firm effects. Results by broad sector of economic activity are 
reported in Table 3 below. The first set of results suggests that in most of the cases, except 
textiles, leather and wearing apparel, within a sector, firms that provide services have higher 
sales of goods, though that may just reflect firm size. In the second type of analysis, we 
include firm and year effects and focus on firms that sell some services. The results indicate 
different patterns across sectors. In some sectors, goods sales have increased with the increase 
in services provision, while in others, selling services has been accompanied by a reduction in 
goods sales. Note, however, that this statistical evidence reflects whether service provision 
allows firms to increase their goods sales or to sell services instead. What our theoretical 
model highlights and explains is complementarity in the demand for goods and services.  
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Table 3 – Goods sales and servitization 
  Dserv>0 (std) R² services (std) R² 
Food, beverages and tobacco 0.329*** (0.055) 0.04 0.022*** (0.004) 0.92 
Textiles, wearing apparel and leather  -0.368*** (0.065) 0.17 -0.040*** (0.007) 0.88 
Wood, paper and printing  -0.05 (0.046) 0.11 -0.008*** (0.003) 0.93 
Chemicals 0.057 (0.131) 0.01 0.042*** (0.011) 0.88 
Pharmaceutical products 0.495 (0.500) 0.02 -0.051** (0.021) 0.93 
Rubber and plastics, and other  non-
metallic mineral products 0.180*** (0.052) 0.03 -0.006* (0.003) 0.92 
Metal 0.039 (0.039) 0.15 -0.020*** (0.003) 0.89 
Computer, electronic and optical 
products, electrical equipment  0.273*** (0.090) 0.01 -0.027*** (0.007) 0.89 
Machinery and equipment 0.056 (0.067) 0.03 -0.008* (0.005) 0.90 
Transport equipment  0.079 (0.159) 0.08 0.028*** (0.008) 0.93 
Furniture; other manufacturing  -0.049 (0.056) 0.01 -0.021*** (0.004) 0.91 
Repair and installation of machinery 
and equipment  -0.470 (0.303) 0.05 -0.030 (0.029) 0.73 
Year effects Yes   Yes   
Sector effects Yes   No   
Firm effects No     Yes     
Notes: Dserv = 1 for firm that sell services: services  is the log of service sales 
Standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
The next section examines whether servitization is associated with other firm 
characteristics, productive efficiency, labour cost and sector characteristics. 
 
IV – Empirical investigation 
 In this section, we evaluate the theoretical predictions of the model and provide an 
econometric assessment of the determinants of servitization, based on the data described in 
the previous section. We first discuss the appropriate econometric estimation procedure, then 
present and discuss the empirical estimates. 
The variable explained in our model is the rate of servitization of firms, which is a 
continuous variable defined between 0 and 1, inclusive. As a result, it is not possible to use 
the ordinary least squares method that suffers from the same defects as when it is applied to 
dichotomous variables. There are several convergent estimation methods for models6 in 
which the explained variable is a fractional variable defined on the interval [0,1]. 
                                                             
6  The fixed effects two-limit Tobit Type I suffers from the incidental parameters problem and its estimation may 
be biased and inconsistent. See for more details, Honoré (1992). Nevertheless, a correlated random effects 
Tobit Model may be estimated in a convergent way, see appendix B. Ramalho et al. (2016, 2017) discuss 
some alternative estimators for factional response models with panel data. Nevertheless, the suggested 
estimators can be applied only when y is defined on the interval ]0,1] or [0,1[ but not on [0,1]. Using a Poisson 
model is not a solution either because it models y >=0 and not 0<= y <=1. 
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We follow the method proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and generalized to 
panel data by Papke and Wooldridge (2008). This method makes it possible to relax the 
strong hypothesis on the density function of the perturbations posed by the two-limit Tobit 
Type I model, namely u|x ~ N(0, V²). This method is based on the idea that we can specify a 
model for E(y|x) in a way that ensures predicted values of y are in (0,1). Papke and 
Wooldridge (1996) following Gouriéroux et al. (1984), propose to estimate this model by a 
Quasi Maximum Likelihood Estimator (QMLE). This estimator is called QMLE fractional 
logit or probit regression regression, depending upon the law (the link function) used. It 
makes it possible to question the hypothesis of strict exogeneity of x by using the 
Chamberlain-Mundlak device (see Papke and Wooldridge, 2008). Nevertheless, it is well 
known (see Greene, 2011, and Wooldridge, 2010) that, contrary to the linear model, ignoring 
the heteroscedasticity in a logit-Probit model may lead to seriously biased and non-convergent 
estimations. So, in order to estimate a fractional response model with an unbalanced panel 
framework, the conditional variance should be allowed to vary with the nature of the 
unbalanced character of the sample. Consequently, we estimate a fractional probit/logit model 
with multiplicative heteroscedasticity. 
We present the estimation results of the fractional Probit model with multiplicative 
heteroscedasticity below.7 An alternative estimation strategy could rely on the two-limit Tobit 
Type I correlated random effects model. A discussion of this model and robustness results are 
given in Appendix B. 
Our specification allows for nonlinear effects of firm-level variables and controls for 
time-varying sector characteristics, sector dummies and year effects. The model also includes 
the Chamberlain-Mundlak correction to control for endogeneity of regressors with respect to 
unobserved firm-specific effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Firm-level 
variables include TFP, age, size and average wage. Sector controls include the Herfindahl 
index, the industry average servitization rate and the standard deviation of the servitization 
rate within the sector. We include square terms of TFP to capture and test for the servitization 
paradox whereby both less efficient firms and more efficient firms may provide services as 
well as goods. Since TFP is a generated regressor, we report bootstrapped estimates in 
Appendix C. 
                                                             
7  Although it is more common to report the marginal effects, we decided to report the coefficient estimates of 
TFP and its squared term to better highlight the U-shape relationship between servitization and TFP. 
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Table 4 - Fractional Probit model with heterogeneity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
tfpit -0.291*** -0.248*** -0.230** -0.233*** -0.222*** 
 (0.102) (0.093) (0.091) (0.087) (0.085) 
tfpit² 0.015*** 0.013** 0.012** 0.011** 0.011** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
ageit  -0.039* -0.035 -0.025 -0.021 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) 
sizeit   -0.043***  -0.036** 
   (0.015)  (0.014) 
wageit    0.136*** 0.128*** 
    (0.031) (0.031) 
ݏ݁ݎݒଓݐଓݖܽݐଓ݋݊௦௧തതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത 1.424*** 1.316*** 1.297*** 1.249*** 1.229*** 
 (0.353) (0.332) (0.327) (0.312) (0.309) 
V(servitization)st 0.235 0.195 0.205 0.131 0.144 
 (0.263) (0.245) (0.242) (0.227) (0.226) 
Herfindahlst -0.131 -0.153 -0.142 -0.148 -0.140 
 (0.159) (0.151) (0.149) (0.140) (0.140) 
constant 0.067 -0.126 -0.265 -3.865*** -3.762*** 
 (0.840) (0.782) (0.791) (1.043) (1.037) 
Observations 36850 36850 36850 36846 36846 
Log likelihood -16344 -16314 -16289 -16182 -16178 
Notes: Robust (clustered by vat) standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include sector and year 
effects and the Chamberlain-Mundlak correction. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Estimates confirm the existence of a non-linear relationship between servitization and 
firms' productivity. As shown in column (1), both the level of TFP and its square are 
significant at conventional significance level. The signs of the coefficients point to a U-
shaped relationship between firms' productivity and servitization, with a turning point at 9.70. 
It is not only low-productivity firms that develop services provision; high-productivity firms 
also do so. Concerning sector-level control variables, neither the Herfindahl index nor the 
standard deviation of the servitization rate by sector is significant (probably because of the 
small time-variation of these indicators). However, as expected, firm servitization rises in 
sectors where servitization increases. This may reflect an imitation process or greater potential 
for bundling services and goods on account of the specificities or technical characteristics of 
the sector's products.  
Columns (2) to (4) include other firm-level variables as determinants of servitization. 
Servitization appears to be greater for younger and smaller firms. Firms' wages have a 
significant relationship with servitization. The last column of the Table brings all variables 
together in the model.  
Although it is standard practice to report marginal effects, we illustrate the relationship 
between servitization and TFP by the predicted values of the dependant variable. Figure 3 
plots average predicted values of servitization for alternative values of TFP. Servitization is 
high for low productivity firms, then decreases as TFP rises, then finally increases again for 
very high levels of productivity. For robustness tests, we also estimate a two-limit Tobit type I 
model. Appendix C compares the two types of estimates. 
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The Figure also illustrates the role of additional firm-level determinants for the 
relationship between TFP and servitization. Introducing firm age, size or wage does not 
substantially alter the relationship between servitization and TFP, although it slightly lowers 
the curvature of the servitisation-TFP relationship.  
Figure 3 – Average predicted servitization rate for alternative values of TFP  
 
Our empirical results of a non-linear relationship between firms' performance and 
servitization confirm the theoretical prediction of a servitization paradox whereby both low-
performing and high-performing firms engage in service provision. Another prediction of the 
model is that this relationship is shaped by a set of factors related to the economic 
environment (e.g. the degree of competition), or product characteristics (the degree of product 
and service differentiation and the degree of demand complementarity between services and 
goods), or production factors (the degree of non-rivalry efficiency allocation between goods 
and services). All these factors suggest that the relationship between firms' performance and 
servitization is likely to vary across sectors.  
We therefore estimate the above model by broad sector of economic activity, using the 
same classification as for the estimation of TFP. We retain only TFP as a firm-level 
determinant. However, due to the small size of the sample, most of the estimated parameters 
are insignificant. We exclude broad sectors for which there are less than 1500 observations, 
and the sector composed of sectors 19, 20, 21 which is too heterogeneous to be considered as 
a single sector in regard to servitization.8 Table 5 below reports estimates for model (1) where 
the only firm-level variable is TFP. The point estimates show that there are differences in the 
relationship between servitization and TFP across sectors.  
                                                             
8   It includes sectors as heterogeneous as coke and refined petroleum products, chemicals and pharmaceutical 
products. 
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Table 5 - Fractional Probit model with heterogeneity by broad sector  
  
tfpit   tfpit²   # obs. 
log 
Likelihoo
d 
 Food, beverages and tobacco -0.414* (0.215) 0.025* (0.013) 5747 -2574 
Textiles, wearing apparel and 
leather -0.976 (0.655) 0.058 (0.039) 3272 -1529 
Wood, paper and printing 
-1.639** (0.743) 0.088** (0.039) 4012 -1330 
       
Rubber and plastics, and 
other  non-metallic mineral 
products 
-0.091 (0.251) 0.002 (0.015) 5139 -2325 
Metal -0.125 (0.205) 0.004 (0.011) 6402 -2453 
Computers, electronic and 
optical products, electrical 
equipment 
-0.018 (0.447) -0.001 (0.024) 2261 -1108 
Machinery and equipment -0.568 (0.611) 0.029 (0.033) 3239 -1564 
       
Furniture, other 
manufacturing -0.978 (0.788) 0.058 (0.049) 1962 -766.6 
       
1 Standard-errors in parentheses 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the results by reporting the estimated servitization rate for a range 
of values of TFP. The bold line represents values that lie within the [P1-P99] range of the TFP 
distribution  of  the  corresponding  broad  sector  of  economic  activity.  The  Figure  shows that,  
the relationship is essentially monotonically decreasing in rubber and plastic, in metal, and in 
computer, electronic and optical products. It is clearly U-shaped in the other manufacturing 
sectors, as in the textile and wood and paper sectors, for example.  
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Figure 4 – Average predicted servitization rate by sector for alternative values of TFP 
  
  
V – Conclusion 
Over the recent decades, manufacturing firms have increasingly offered services to customers 
along with goods. In some cases, firms that traditionally sold almost nothing but goods now 
obtain most of their turnover from services.  
There are several possible reasons why firms provide the customer services themselves 
rather than outsourcing them or letting other firms provide them. Since developing a new 
activity - the provision of services - involves both costs and risks, one may argue that only the 
more efficient firms can afford it. However, less efficient firms may also use it as a defensive 
strategy, to differentiate their product and sustain market shares, or new firms may use it as an 
offensive strategy to capture a new market. 
To gain a deeper understanding of these mechanisms, this paper develops a theoretical 
model that contains the following ingredients: the demand for differentiated goods and 
services is complementary, firms decide on the allocation of (rivalrous) expertise between 
goods production and services provision. Furthermore, expertise is unevenly distributed 
across firms; they operate under monopolistic competition. The model predicts that the extent 
of servitization depends on firm characteristics, product characteristics and market conditions. 
In particular, the relationship between firm efficiency and servitization is probably non-linear. 
Furthermore, the relationship varies across products and sectors. 
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0.6
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Food, beverages and tobacco Textiles, wearing apparel and leather
Wood, paper and printing Rubber, plastics, other non-metallic mineral
Metal Computers, electronic and optical , electrical
Machinery and equipment Furniture, other manufacturing
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These predictions are supported by our empirical evaluation. Estimating a fractional 
Probit model of servitization for Belgian manufacturing firms, we find a U-shaped 
relationship between servitization and firms' Total Factor Productivity, the curvature of which 
varies by sector. 
Previous evidence (Ariu et al. 2016), Crozet and Millet, 2015) suggests that 
servitization increases a firm's performance in terms of profitability, sales and employment. 
What our paper shows is that evidence that a firm undertakes servitization gives no 
information on the current state of its performance. For example, it may be a strategy 
followed by a low performance firm to survive and gain market shares, or a way for a high 
performance firm to create a barrier to entry. 
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 Appendix A: Production function coefficients estimation 
 
Table A1 : Estimates of production function per sector by the Ackerberg-Caves-Frazer 
method (1997-2013 period) 
Sectorial Classification (Nace rev 2) lnk lnl # observations 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco (10, 
11, 12) 
0.203 0.752 44138 
(22.53) (84.46)  
Textiles, Wearing Apparel and 
Leather (13, 14, 15) 
0.225 0.686 18737 
(38.73) (94.60)  
Wood, Paper and Printing (16, 17, 
18) 
0.173 0.736 36125 
(39.27) (162.93)  
Coke, Chemicals and Pharmaceutics 
(19, 20, 21) 
0.242 0.813 8613 
(28.83) (84.20)  
Rubber, Plastic and Other Non-
Metallic Mineral Products (22, 23) 
0.215 0.740 23591 
(21.24) (70.13)  
Basics Metals and Fabricated Metal 
Products (24, 25) 
0.170 0.740 48114 
(59.58) (237.80)  
Computers, Electronic, Optical 
products and Electrical Equipment 
(26, 27) 
0.167 0.825 11643 
(16.49) (59.69)  
Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment n.e.c. (28) 
0.212 0.740 15193 
(0.79) (2.69)  
Transport equipment (29, 30) 0.185 0.830 5022 
(21.92) (81.96)  
Manufacture of furniture and other 
manufacturing (31, 32) 
0.356 0.608 12520 
(1.06) (1.97)  
Repair and installation of machinery 
and equipment (33) 
0.182 0.787 8014 
(36.64) (117.50)  
t student statistics in parentheses. Physical investment is 
used as a proxy and the capital stock is measured at the 
beginning of year. 
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Table A.2 – Descriptive statistics on firm-level determinants of servitization 
  N mean std p1 p25 p50 p75 p99 
TFP 36857 9.10 0.65 7.23 8.75 9.16 9.52 10.43 
age 37228 28 18 2 15 24 37 88 
employment  37203 166 422 22 38 62 135 1987 
average wage 37200 29821 10573 12358 22958 27892 34361 66335 
 
Table A.3 - TFP distribution by broad sector of economic activity 
 mean std p1 p25 p50 p75 p99 
Food, beverages and tobacco 9.03 0.53 7.56 8.74 9.01 9.33 10.31 
Textiles, wearing apparel and 
leather  8.84 0.48 7.42 8.58 8.85 9.13 9.98 
Wood, paper and printing  9.50 0.42 8.45 9.26 9.49 9.73 10.57 
Chemicals 8.70 0.43 7.47 8.45 8.71 8.96 9.75 
Pharmaceutical products 8.38 0.52 7.15 8.06 8.31 8.57 9.95 
Rubber and plastics, and other  
non-metallic mineral products 8.90 0.48 7.70 8.67 8.90 9.14 9.97 
Metal 9.53 0.40 8.47 9.31 9.51 9.74 10.55 
Computer, electronic and optical 
products and electrical equipment  9.57 0.48 8.34 9.29 9.59 9.88 10.61 
Machinery and equipment 9.41 0.42 8.52 9.13 9.37 9.67 10.54 
Transport equipment  9.13 0.43 7.91 8.92 9.16 9.39 10.14 
Furniture; other manufacturing; 
repair and installation of 
machinery and equipment  7.64 0.41 6.72 7.39 7.63 7.87 8.72 
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Appendix B : robustness analysis. Alternative estimation. 
 
For robustness we also estimate a two-limit Tobit type I model. This can be used in the 
context of corner solution models in which we observe a rate of servitization between 0 and 1. 
However in this case, a rate of 0 or 1 is an economic decision, i.e. the result of a firm's profit 
maximisation and not the result of a truncation process due to failure to observe the latent 
variable (see Wooldridge, 2010). By setting, 1 0D   a1 = 0 and a2 = 1, we can model the latent 
variable y*= XE + u with u|x ~ N(0,V²). y* is the latent variable and so we define the observed 
rate of servitization as: 
 
y = 0 if y* <= 0 
y = y* if 0 < y* < 1 
y = 1 if y* >= 1                  
 
In fact, y* has no real economic interpretation. The servitization rate cannot be lower 
than 0% or greater than 100% (even in a latent interpretation).  It only restricts y, the variable 
of interest, to between 0 and 1. The model can be estimated in a convergent and 
asymptotically efficient way by the maximum likelihood method. This specification, besides 
being  well  adapted  to  the  case  of  a  variable  fractional  response,  offers  several  other  
advantages. First, it adapts quite easily to the case of panel data (and hence to the unobserved 
heterogeneity  of  firms)  in  the  context  of  the  random  effects  two-limit  Tobit  Type  I  model.  
Second, it allows us to question the hypothesis of strict exogeneity of the covariates by using 
the  framework  of  the  correlated  random  effects  Tobit  model  which  is  an  adaptation  of  the  
Chamberlain-Mundlak method used for Probit models with random effects on panel data (see 
Wooldridge, 2010). However, this method may be non-convergent in the case of 
heteroscedasticity of disturbances (see Wooldridge, 2010). 
As in the fractional Probit model with heterogeneity, we include level and squared 
terms of firm-level determinants of servitization, and the same set of sector-level variables 
and other controls. The two models deliver essentially similar results, as illustrated by 
marginal effects for alternative values of TFP, reported in Figure B1 below. 
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Figure B -  Average marginal effects of TFP for the fractional Probit model with 
heterogeneity (Probit) and a two-limit Tobit type I model (Tobit), for alternative sets of 
firm-level determinants. 
B.1 Model (1) with TFP     B.2. Model (2) with TFP and age             
   
B.3. Model (3) with TFP, age and size          B.4. Model (3) with TFP, age, size and wage             
   
Notes: Sector-level variables are set at their mean value, the reference sector is “food, beverages and tobacco” 
and the reference year is 2013 
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Appendix C : Bootstrap estimates of the fractional Probit model 
 
Table C.1 - Fractional Probit model with heterogeneity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
tfpit -0.307* -0.256* -0.242 -0.196 -0.180 
 (0.167) (0.152) (0.149) (0.151) (0.147) 
tfpit² 0.015* 0.013 0.012 0.009 0.008 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
ageit  -0.025 -0.019 -0.015 -0.007 
  (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) 
sizeit   -0.058**  -0.054** 
   (0.025)  (0.025) 
wageit    -1.652** -1.645*** 
    (0.643) (0.638) 
wageit²    0.086*** 0.085*** 
    (0.032) (0.032) 
ݏ݁ݎݒଓݐଓݖܽݐଓ݋݊௦௧തതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത 1.816*** 1.638*** 1.611*** 1.773*** 1.724*** 
 (0.554) (0.514) (0.503) (0.526) (0.514) 
V(servitization)st 0.028 0.032 0.048 -0.129 -0.110 
 (0.427) (0.392) (0.382) (0.395) (0.385) 
Herfindahlst -0.195 -0.221 -0.206 -0.219 -0.208 
 (0.254) (0.238) (0.231) (0.239) (0.232) 
Bootstrap estimates using 500 replications. Bootstrap by firm.  
Robust clustered) standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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